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Abstract 
This study aims to analyze the board of directors’ diversity and monitoring intensity on bank 
profitability. Board of directors’ diversity is measured by a composite index of gender, age, 
education, citizenship, and independence of the board of directors. Meanwhile, monitoring 
intensity is measured by the composition of audit quality, the number of meetings, and the 
committee's number. The objects are banks listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange period of 
2015-2017 with a panel data regression. Selected samples were 40 banks and 120 
observations. The results showed that board of directors’ diversity had a significant negative 
on profitability. This result provokes a gap in the previous research and doesn’t support 
resource dependence theory. The board of directors must respond quickly to market needs; 
however, the board of directors' diversity seems to hinder quality business decisions to 
increase bank profitability. While monitoring intensity is positively significant to profitability, 
so this result can support agency theory. Monitoring by diverse boards of directors seems to 
reduce agency costs, thereby increasing bank profitability effectively. Some practical and 
implications will be discussed in this study. 
Key Words: Board of Directors Diversity, Monitoring Intensity, Bank Profitability, Resource 
Dependence Theory, Agency Theory 
INTRODUCTION   
Research about the relationship between boards of directors and profitability is usually based 
on two theories. As the dominant theory, agency theory states that the board's main activity is 
supervising management on behalf of shareholders, and effectivity can improve firm performance 
by reducing agency costs (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). These researchers have examined the 
relationship between proxies of board incentives under supervision (e.g., board dependency or 
stock compensation) and financial performance that has mixed results. Vermoesen et al. (2020) 
examine cash bonuses paid to directors on firm performance. The result is that directors' bonuses 
are positively correlated with financial performance, so based on agency theory, these findings can 
align directors' and shareholders' interests. Different results from Chapple and Humphrey (2014) 
state that diversity on the board is not related to performance besides that there is a weak negative 
correlation between having multiple female boards on performance.  
While the agency model has dominated corporate governance research in general, and 
boards of directors in particular, evaluating board members' diversity requires one to take a plural 
approach, including not only the different board theories, such as resource dependence theory 
(Fernández-Temprano and Tejerina-Gaite 2020). The theory of resource dependence with basic 
capital as the main concern. It consists of human capital (experience, expertise, reputation) and 
relational capital (the network of other companies and external possibilities). Resource 
dependency theory examines how a board's capital leads to its provision of resources (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003). Empirical studies in resource dependency theory have shown a relationship 
between board capacity and profitability (Pfeffer, 1972; Kılıç and Kuzey, 2016). Kılıç and Kuzey 
(2016) use female directors as describing board characteristics, and the result is the diversity of 
women's boards have a positive impact on financial performance; according to the resource 
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dependence theory, female directors have the potential impact on increasing financial 
performance with different views in the discussion, positive view of shareholders, building positive 
firm image, and maintain a competitive advantage. Dewi and Dewi (2016) Reinforced show that 
gender and educational background diversity on the board positively affect firm value. 
Indonesia has the same system as countries in Europe, a two-tier board system, where the 
company has two boards, namely a board of directors that carries out company operations and a 
board of commissioners that examines the board of directors (Pudjiastuti and Mardiyah, 2007). 
The board of directors is the most responsible party for the organization's performance, where 
one of the benchmarks is financial performance. 
Board diversity has developed to be a concern and issue in Good Corporate Governance 
(GCG) in the last decade, in another word, the optimal board composition is needed to produce 
an optimal GCG (Fidanoski et al., 2014:82). The greater the diversity within board members can 
cause many conflicts but can provide a variety of alternative solutions compared to homogeneous 
board members; hence board of directors’ diversity can provide unique characteristics for 
companies that can generate added value (Astuti, 2017). 
Board effectiveness requires cultural, experiences, and gender diversity, known as 
demographic diversity, to guide and contribute to organizational learning and improve 
management strategic decision making (Ben-Amar et al., 2013). Previous research distinguished 
between demographic diversity and structural diversity (Ben-Amar et al., 2013; Ararat et al., 2015). 
The impact of demographic diversity is generally associated with service tasks, while structural 
diversity is measured by board independence, which is linked to controlling tasks (Ararat et al., 
2015). 
According to Forbes and Milliken (1999), the board's characteristics consist of demographics 
and knowledge/skills (cognitive). Board diversity can be a unique characteristic but impactful on 
increasing conflict, increasing the cognitive conflict for decision making to the company. Increased 
cognitive conflict can result in effective decision-making, ultimately impacting firm performance 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999). For example, van den Oever and Beerens (2020) investigate how 
board gender diversity impacts task-related conflict and how task-related conflict, in turn, impacts 
organizational performance, and their findings find evidence for a partial mediating role of task-
related conflict in the organizational performance relationship of board gender diversity. 
Monitoring carried out by the board of directors can cause agency costs due to separation of 
ownership and control to improve company performance (Fama, 1980; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
Further, this is also effective when the company has bigger control than the partner as the owner 
gets bigger (Nguyen, Vu, and Doan 2020). Khan et al. (2020) study confirms the literature that the 
agency's cost and company performance are negatively connected to the listed Chinese 
companies. 
The research results on demographic, cognitive and structural diversity on profitability have 
mixed results (Mahadeo et al., 2012; Ararat et al., 2015; Herdhayinta et al., 2017; Reguera-
Alvarado et al., 2017; Kusuma et al., 2018). The inconsistency of the results caused by different 
locations, methodology, and variables (Hermalin and Weisback, 2003; Carter et al., 2010). Studies 
on the demographic diversity effect on firm performance in emerging markets are rarely studied 
and not statistically significant or only focus on a single dimension of diversity such as gender or 
race (Ararat et al., 2015). This study will integrate demographic, structural and cognitive diversity 
in the board of directors diversity to enrich previous research (Chapple and Humphrey, 2014; 
Fidanoski et al., 2014; Ramadhani and Adhariani, 2015; Galbreath, 2016; Kılıç and Kuzey, 2016; 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT   
Agency Theory 
The board supervision function, described as a "control" (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Pearce 
and Zahra, 1992; Johnson et al., 1996), has drawn attention to corporate governance researchers 
from several disciplines (law, finance, sociology, and strategic management) for several years 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) for example Khan et al. (2020). The basis for the theory of board 
supervision function comes from agency theory, which describes the potential for conflicts that 
arise due to the separation of ownership and control in organizations (Berle and Means, 1932; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). Theorists concluded that the primary function of the board is to monitor 
the actions of the "agent" (management) to protect the interest of the owner’s "principal" (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Board monitoring is important because of the potential costs incurred when management 
pursues its interests at shareholders' expense (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). When ownership and 
control are separated like most modern companies today, managers can pursue their self-interest 
at the expense of profit maximization, thus creating "agency" costs (Berle and Means, 1932). 
Monitoring by the board of directors can reduce agency costs inherent in separating ownership 
and control and can improve firm performance (Fama, 1980; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Ararat et 
al. (2015) stated that diversity could lead to better monitoring by preventing groupthink and 
triggering critical investigations to produce decisions that can improve financial performance. 
Resource Dependency Theory 
The second important board function is providing resources. This function refers directly to 
the board's ability to bring resources to the company, resources of whatever may be considered 
a particular firm's strength or weakness (Wernerfelt, 1984:172). The theoretical thinking of this 
function is based on Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) regarding resource dependence. Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978:163) stated that "when an organization appoints an individual to a board, the 
organization expects that the individual will support the organization, focus his attention on 
organizational problems, vary its ways to convey it to others, and will trying to support the 
organization ". Some of the benefits that can be provided by the board: (1) advice, (2) legitimacy, 
(3) information communication channels between external organizations and the company, and 
(4) access of preference commitments or support from important elements outside the company 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
The resource dependency logic suggests that board resources are directly related to firm 
performance (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Resources help reduce dependency between 
organizations and external contingencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), reduce the uncertainty of 
the firm (Pfeffer 1972), reduce transaction costs (Williamson 1984), and ultimately help the 
survival of the firm (Singh et al., 1986). 
The terminology used in board-related resource dependency theory is human capital 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Resource dependency theory researchers discuss the expertise, 
experiences, knowledge, reputation, and skills of the board of directors (Becker 1993; Coleman 
1988). They also discuss the role of board bonding for external organizations (H. White 1961; H. 
C. White 1963; Jacobs 1961), who study relational capital in social bonds. Relational capital, or 
so-called social capital, explicitly refers to "the actual and potential amount of resources 
embedded, available, and derived from the network of relationships of individuals or social units" 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Thus, the term board capital (including human and relational 
capital) is a useful way of understanding the provision of board resources to firms, linked to firm 
performance (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
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Relationship Between Board of Directors Diversity and Bank Profitability  
According to Fidanoski et al. (2014:82), board diversity has become a concern of the crucial 
issue of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) in the last decade, or it can be said that the optimal 
board composition can produce optimal GCG. Meanwhile, according to Astuti (2017), greater 
diversity in board members causes many conflicts, but on the other hand, conflicts that arise can 
provide various alternative solutions compared to homogeneous board members, so that 
diversity on the board of directors can provide unique characteristics for companies that can 
create value-added. 
The logic of resource dependence implies that board resources are directly linked to 
company efficiency (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). Tools help minimize organizational dependence 
and external contingencies (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), reduce business instability (Pfeffer 1972), 
decrease transaction costs (Williamson 1984), and eventually help the company's survival (Singh 
et al., 1986). 
Board effectiveness requires cultural, experiential, and gender diversity, known as 
demographic diversity, to guide and contribute to organizational learning and improve 
management strategic decision making (Ben-Amar et al., 2013). Previous research distinguished 
between demographic diversity and structural diversity (Ben-Amar et al., 2013; Ararat et al., 
2015). The impact of demographic diversity is generally related to service tasks, while structural 
diversity is measured by board independence associated with control tasks (Ararat et al., 2015). 
According to Forbes and Milliken (1999), the board's characteristics consist of demographics 
and knowledge/skills (cognitive). Board diversity can be a unique characteristic, but the impact 
on increasing conflict, thus increasing cognitive conflict for the company. Increased cognitive 
conflict can result in effective decision-making, ultimately impacting firm performance (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999). Cognitive diversity can improve cognitive conflict between boards so that it 
can stimulate "investigative and critical interaction processes" (Amason, 1996:104) and will 
increase the performance of board control (Forbes and Milliken, 1999:494). The empirical 
research results also show that diversity of opinions and conflicts can contribute to strategic 
decision-making quality (Schweiger et al., 1986).  
Previous research that discussed demographic, cognitive and structural diversity on the 
financial performance obtained different results. Fernandes et al. (2017) found that age and 
gender diversity improved banks' performance during the crisis, so diversity is significant. 
Talavera et al. (2018) found in Chinese banks that age diversity has a significant negative effect 
on bank profitability, and also, heterogeneity of directors' perceptions about risk, prudence, and 
wealth harms bank profitability. Research that has been conducted by Kusuma et al. (2018) found 
that gender diversity does not affect bank performance. Although significant internationalization 
of the board harms bank results, foreign directors' involvement tends to be less harmful during 
the crisis in the Eurozone and diversity-friendly countries (Arnaboldi et al. 2020). Gafoor et al. 
(2018) also see positive and meaningful ties between the board's independence and bank 
performance. 
This research tries to analyze several aspects of the board of directors’ diversity, namely 
gender, age, foreign boards, independence board, and education, and then combine it into a 
single board diversity index according to Ararat et al. (2015). Then the hypothesis is as follows: 
H1 : Board of directors' diversity influences bank profitability. 
Relationship Monitoring Intensity and Bank Profitability  
Board of directors' oversight will reduce the agency's costs inherent in dividing ownership 
and management and boost organization efficiency (Fama, 1980; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
Effective monitoring is expected to weaken agency conflict within the company (Ararat et al., 
2010), thereby increasing profitability. We use the board of directors' number of meetings, audit 
quality, and a board committee to describe monitoring intensity-based from Ararat et al. (2015). 
The results of research by Lai et al. (2017) revealed that audit committees with female directors 
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(members) are more likely to expect higher audit quality, but on the other hand, Erin et al. (2018) 
in Nigeria found that audit committee has not to effect on bank performance. Phan et al. (2020) 
show that the firms' financial performance listed on the Hanoi Stock Trading Floor was favorably 
affected by the audit quality. Gafoor et al. (2018) results find that for bank performance, the 
number of board meetings and a greater number of financial experts on the board are significant. 
Simultaneously, the research results of Ararat et al. (2010) found that board diversity has a 
significant positive effect on monitoring intensity conducted by the board. Then the hypothesis is 
as follows: 
H2 : Monitoring intensity influences bank profitability. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The population used in this study is conventional banks listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange from 2015-2017, which present annual reports on each bank's websites. The sampling 
technique uses total sampling. Data collection obtained 40 conventional banks as units of analysis 
that met the criteria; hence, the number of observation units in this study was three periods 
multiplied by 40 observation units, 120 observations.  
Table 1. Sample Calculation 
No Description Total 
1 Conventional bank population 43 
2 Not listed on the IDX for three 
consecutive years (ARTO and BTPS) 
(2) 
3 Acquisition and changed bank name 
(BEKS) 
(1) 
 Total sample 40 
 
While the variables in this research can be seen in Table 2. 
Table 2. Research Variables 




Profitability is the bank’s ability 
to generate profits (Swandayani 
and Kusumaningtias, 2012). 
ROA =
Profit before Tax
Total Average of the Asset
 
(Horne and Wachowicz 2008) 
2 Board Diversity 
(Dependent) 
The board diversity is a 
heterogeneous board in terms of 
gender, age, race, education, 
experience, lifestyle, culture, 
religion, and other aspects that 
can create uniqueness (Mishra 
and Jhunjhunwala, 2013). 
1. Gender diversity consists of two 
categories, female and male.  
2. Age dispersion is measured with five 
categories: 1= 25-35; 2= 36-45; 3= 46-
55; 4= 56-65 and 5=more than 65 
years. 
3. The diversity of the foreign board of 
directors consists of two categories: 
board of directors with foreign 
nationality and Indonesian nationality. 
4. Independence diversity consists of two 
categories: the independent board of 
directors and the non-independent 
board of directors.  
5. There are five categories of education 
diversity, they are elementary school 
and junior high school, senior high 
school, diploma/bachelor, master, and 
doctoral (Ararat et al., 2015) 
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Board monitoring intensity is the 
board's role as supervisor to 
ensure managers pursue 
stakeholders' interests (Lahlou, 
2018). 
1. Number of integrated meetings 
between commissioners and directors. 
Number of meeting 3-12 = 1; 13-30 = 2 
and >30 = 3. 
2. The number of board committees is a 
few formed board committees. 
Number of committee 0-1 = 1, number 
of committee 2 = 2  and  number of 
committee >3 = 3. 
3. Auditor quality is measured by 
categorized into three categories: 
Auditor Big-4 = 3, international auditor 
= 2, and local auditor = 1 (Ararat et al., 
2015) 
5 Firm Size 
(Control) 
Darmawati (2015) stated that 
the companies’ size calculations 
aim to assess the companies’ 
value.   
Firm Size = Ln Total Aset 
(Kılıç and Kuzey, 2016) 
6 Leverage 
(Control) 
Leverage is the companies’ 
ability in fulfilling the long-term 
responsibility and short-term 
responsibility when the 
companies are liquidated 
(Darmawati, 2015) 
Leverage =
Total Book Value of Debt
Total Asset Book Value
 
(Abdullah, 2004) 
Each category in the board diversity variable is measured using the Blau Index (Blau, 1977): 





Pi = proportion of board member in the i category from attributes  
k = number of attributes’ categories 
Standardizing the Blau index for each of the five board diversity attributes is done by dividing 
each attribute by the theoretical maximum value ((k-1) / k). To measure the board of directors' 
diversity, this research tries to build a composite index by adding up all the standardized values of 
the Blau Index for all the diverse attributes of the board (Agresti and Agresti, 1978). The monitoring 
intensity variable's measurement uses a scale of comparison between the value obtained by each 
company within a year divided by its maximum value; hence, a single index of monitoring intensity 
is obtained. Apart from variables related to board diversity and monitoring intensity, two control 
variables were also included in this study. According to Reguera-Alvarado et al. (2017), this study 
controls the firm size in the LN_ASET variable. The second is leverage (LEV), according to Ararat et 
al. (2015). 
The research method used is a quantitative descriptive analysis method of all the variables 
studied. This study also uses regression analysis to determine the effect of the independent 
variable toward the dependent variables with the following equation: 
ROA  = α+β1KD+β2IM +β3LN_ASET+ β4LEV+e2 .............................................................(2) 
Definition: 
ROA : Return on Assets (Bank Profitability) 
KD  : Board of Directors Diversity 
IM  : Monitoring Intensity 
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LN_ASET : Firm Size 
LEV  : Leverage 
α  : Constant 
β  : Coefisien 
e  : error of term 
Further, regression analysis with the above equation is performed by first carrying out a 
classic assumption test consisting of normality, multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity tests. 
Furthermore, testing the model's accuracy consisting of the model significance test (statistical test 
F), test the coefficient of determination R², and hypothesis testing. We use SPSS 26 version to 











Figure 1. Research Framework 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION  
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics presented in this research is the minimum value, maximal, average, and 
standard deviation values are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
KD 120 0,40 3,57 1,9901 0,82984 
IM 120 0,56 1,00 0,7713 0,09801 
ROA 120 -0,11 0,04 0,0099 0,02171 
LN_ASET 120 28,31 34,61 31,0549 1,78322 
LEV 120 0,61 0,94 0,8443 0,04920 
Valid N (listwise) 120     
Sources: Processed Data 
The highest variable KD of 3,57 was BKSW in 2015, and the lowest 0,4 was BACA in 2015 and 
BJTM in 2015-2016, the average value was 1,9901 and standard deviation 0,82984. The highest 
variable IM as much as 1 was BBRI in 2015, BBTN in 2016-2017, as well as MEGA in 2016-2017 and 
the lowest 0,56, was INPC in 2016, BBNP in 2017 and BBMD in 2015-2017, the average value was 
0,7713, and the standard deviation was 0,09801. The highest variable value of ROA 0,04 was BBRI 
in 2015, and the lowest 0,11 was BSWD in 2016 with an average value of 0,0099 and standard 
deviation of 0,02171. 
The highest variable value of LN_ASET 34,61 was BBRI in 2017, and the lowest 28,31 was 
BGTB in 2015, with an average value was 31, 0549 and a standard deviation of 1,78322. The highest 
variable value of LEV 0,94 was BBPK in 2015, and the lowest 0,61 was BINA in 2017 with an average 
value of 0,8443 and standard deviation of 0,04920. 
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Classic Assumptions Test 
In this study, the normality test used the Skewness test model. The normality test in Table 4 
showed that the Skewness value was -3,335, so the Zskew value obtained was -14,91 below 1,96 
that it can be said the data has been normally distributed. 
Table 4. Normality Tes 
 
N Skewness 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error 
Unstandardized Residual 120 -3,335 0,221 
Valid N (listwise) 120   
 Sources: Processed Data 
To determine whether multicollinearity can be seen from the tolerance value and VIF value. 
If the tolerance value is > 0.05 and the VIF value is <10, then the model free from multicollinearity. 
The multicollinearity test in Table 5 depicts that all variables have tolerance values are > 0.05, and 
VIF values are < 10, then it is free of multicollinearity.  
Table 5. Multicollinearity Test  
Model Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)   
KD 0,953 1,049 
IM 0,959 1,042 
LN_ASET 0,904 1,107 
LEV 0,972 1,029 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
 Source: Processed Data  
 
The white test was used to test for heteroscedasticity. The heteroscedasticity test in Table 6 
in significance level of 0,05 shows that it is free of heteroscedasticity.  
 
Table 6. Heteroscedasticity Test  
Chi-Square df Sig. 
14,854 14 0,388 
Source: Processed Data 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
F test was exercised to test the accuracy of the regression model. From the calculation result, 
it obtained F value = 10,5707 (p = 0,0000), then it can be concluded that the model is fit at 5% 
degree of confidence. Determinant coefficient (Adj R2) means that the model's ability to explain 
the profitability variable was 24,3%, and 75,7% was explained by the other variables from the 
research model. Based on Table 7, the multiple linear regression equation as follows: 
 
ROA  = -0,1040 + -0,0055KD + 0,0395IM + 0053LN_ASET + -0,0824LEV+e2 ...................... [3] 
 
Table 7. Hypothesis Test 
Variable Coefficient T Sig. t Conclusion 
Constant -0,1040    
KD -0,0055 -2,5618 0,0117 Significant 
IM 0,0395 2,1909 0,0305 Significant 
LN_ASET 0,0053 -5,1695 0,0000 Significant 
LEV -0,0824 -2,3085 0,0228 Significant 
R = 0,5185 R2 = 0,2688 Adj R2 = 0,243 
F = 10,5707 p = 0,0000 
 
 Sources: Processed Data 
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Further, the hypothesis tests are done by using a multiple regression model. The hypothesis 
test was performed by using a t-test. t-test was done by observing the significance level of 5% to 
identify whether or not there is significance influence among tested variables (Ghozali 2016). Table 
6 show that all hypothesis test can be accepted. It can be concluded as follows: 1) Board of 
directors diversity (KD) tvalue -2,5618 < ttable = -1,98081 or significance = 0,0117 < 0,05 and 
coefficient value -0,0055 which means there is a significant negative effect between board of 
directors diversity toward bank profitability, so  hypothesis 1 accepted. 2) Monitoring intensity (IM) 
tvalue 2,1909 > ttable = 1,98081 or significance = 0,0305 < 0,05 and coefficient value 0,0395 which 
means there is a significant positive effect between monitoring intensity toward bank profitability, 
so hypothesis 2 accepted. 3) Firm size (LN_ASET)as control variable tvalue -5,1695 < ttable = -1,98081 
or significance = 0,0000 < 0,05 and coefficient value 0,0053 which means there is a significant 
positive effect between firm size toward bank profitability. 4) Leverage (LEV) as control variable 
tvalue -2,3085 < ttable = -1,98081 or significance = 0,0228 < 0,05 and coefficient value -0,0824 which 
means there is a significant negative effect between leverage toward bank profitability. 
DISCUSSION 
Relationship Between Board of Directors Diversity and Bank Profitability  
The first hypothesis test showed that the board diversity has a significant negative effect on 
profitability by identifying the significance level below 5% (p = 0,0117). The logic of resource 
dependence is essentially the capital/resource attached to the board of directors in running the 
company. This study's findings prove that the board of directors has not used all its capabilities to 
improve bank performance. These results showed that board diversification tends to lower the 
banks’ profitability compared with the research done by Ararat et al. (2015). Previous research 
that used the same variables has not many things to do; hence this result can be a gap of the 
previous studies. It can be comprehended that the researches’ diversity in a team can lead to a 
loss process (Steiner, 1972), which comes from conflict and communication problems (Miller and 
Triana, 2009).  
These results also reject the statement of Forbes and Milliken (1999), which stated that the 
increasing cognitive conflict within the board of directors could cause effective decision making, 
which affects the companies’ performance. The board of directors' diversity may require a process 
to achieve good results; even diversity is also required a good decision-making process. However, 
the fast decision-making process takes time, especially if there is a rotation of directors every year. 
The variety of board decision might have better quality in the end but failed to balance the negative 
effect from the decision-making process which tend to be slow when the market demand fast 
response (Hambrick et al., 1996). This paper result aligns with Talavera et al. (2018) research in 
China also finds the contrary finding. This is about the communication barrier that happened 
among board members with different age gaps, although Darmadi (2011) mentioned that young 
members' presence tends to boost the financial performance. Talavera et al. (2018) further 
mentioned that it depends on the diversity of personal values as it should be noticed that China’s 
cultural value is different; hence they find that less age-diversity will take the company in a similar 
direction that board of directions goes into. On the contrary, according to Arioglu (2020), it is a 
different case with Turkey, although they do not value diversity as it will lead to conflict, the 
decision-making lies in the superiors, as they have a paternal culture that leads the older to make 
the decisions. Indonesia has a better culture than Turkey in terms of diversity, which should be an 
added value for companies, especially banking in Indonesia. 
Relationship Monitoring Intensity and Bank Profitability  
The results of testing the second hypothesis indicate that the intensity of monitoring has a 
significant positive effect on profitability, as is seen from the significance level, which was below 
5% (p = 0.0305). The result support previous research conducted by Ararat et al. (2010). Hermalin 
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and Weisback (2003) suggest that stronger monitoring can improve firm performance by reducing 
agency costs. It is believed that the stronger the agency conflict, the higher the connection 
between the intensity of board monitoring and firm performance (Ebenezer, 2017). The 
monitoring role played by the board of directors is an important corporate governance control 
mechanism (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008). Hence a good corporate governance mechanism 
will improve stakeholders' value-added. It improves the financial performance (Mahrani and 
Soewarno 2018). Monitoring by the board of directors can reduce agency costs inherent in 
separating ownership and control and can improve firm performance (Fama, 1980; Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989). So, this result can support agency theory. 
The control variables tested showed consistent results with previous researches (Ararat et al., 
2015; Ramadhani and Adhariani, 2015; Gordini and Rancati, 2017). Firm size has a significant 
positive effect on profitability seen from a significance level below 5% (p = 0.0000), while leverage 
has a significant negative effect on profitability seen from a significance level below 5% (p = 
0.0228). 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of board diversity and monitoring 
intensity on profitability. The research object is a conventional bank listed on the IDX for the 2015-
2017 period using total sampling. Hence 40 banks and 120 observations were obtained. Data 
sources are obtained from the annual reports published on the websites of each bank. The results 
of data analysis can be concluded as follows: 1) Board of directors' diversity has a significant 
negative effect on profitability, so the first hypothesis is accepted. Even though the hypothesis is 
accepted, it has a negative direction, which means that high diversity has implications for 
decreased profitability, so that it becomes a theoretical gap as well as the results of previous 
studies (e.g., Ararat et al., 2015), so this result doesn’t support resource dependence theory. The 
board of directors is required to respond quickly to market needs. However, the board of directors' 
diversity seems to hinder quality business decisions to increase bank profitability. 2) Other results 
show that monitoring intensity has a significant positive effect on profitability. Therefore, the 
second hypothesis is accepted, which means that monitoring activities carried out by the board 
have a positive impact on profitability so that this result can support agency theory. Monitoring by 
diverse boards of directors seems to reduce agency costs, thereby increasing bank profitability 
effectively. 
The practical implication for banking is that the board of directors' diversity should increase 
profitability, not only as a “window dressing” or even merely fulfilling the board of directors (Carter 
et al., 2003). Meanwhile, the intensity of monitoring has been shown to increase profitability. This 
research is limited to banking objects only. Therefore, it cannot be generalized. The next research 
can add other objects and increase observation’s period to make it more comprehensive. Even 
though all the hypotheses are accepted, Adj R2 is classified as low at only 24.3%, so it is necessary 
to explore other variables that affect profitability. Because of the gap in the research results 
between the board of directors' diversity and profitability, future research can also analyze 
decision-making processes that can affect profitability so that there may be a mediating variable 
involved (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
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